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(1985)
49-11-1. Short title - Scope. This act is known as the Utah
Public Safety Retirement Act. It shall include in its coverage
all public employees engaged full time in public safety work under
this chapter, except a public employee serving as the commissioner
of public safety, or as the elected or appointed sheriff or chief
of police of a public safety organization, if that public employee
files a formal written request seeking exclusion from coverage,
but the public employee cannot continue employment in the same
covered employer unit and receive payment from the retirement
office at the same time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case to determine the applicability of an amendment to
49-11-1, U.C.A. 1933, as amended (S.B. 57) which became law in March,
1985, after signing by the Governor, to twenty-one police chiefs and
sheriffs in the State of Utah.

Judgment was entered for plaintiffs.

The Utah State Legislature in 1983, at the request of various
public safety officials, enacted House Bill 239 amending Section 1 of
Title 49, Chapter 11, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, by adding to the paragraph covering for purposes of participation in the Public Safety
Retirement System ". . .

all public employees engaged full time in

public safety work . . .", an authorized exception as to certain such
employees when it said " . . .

except a public employee serving as the

commissioner of public safety, or as the elected or appointed sheriff,
a chief of police of a public safety organization if the public employee
files a formal written request seeking exclusion from coverage.11
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This action was commenced on behalf of the twenty-one individual
plaintiffs to compel the retirement office to continue making the
payments notwithstanding the enactment of Senate Bill 57.

After filing

of a stipulation of facts and a half day of argument, Judge Jay E. Banks
granted a permanent order enjoining the retirement office from withholding payments to the individual plaintiffs.

-4-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In enacting House Bill 239 legislative intent was to accomplish
what in fact was done in Senate Bill 57: i.e., the employment as a
police chief for an employer other than the one from which such officer
had "retired."

The contention was made that our retirement system was

making it virtually impossible for a police officer on the Wasatch
front to compete with out of state applicants for appointment as a
police chief in the outlying cities and communities because of the
reduced compensation upon which the final average salary would be
computed for retirement purposes.

An officer may have had years and

experience in Wasatch front law enforcement which would qualify him for
a police chief appointment elsewhere in the State, but he could not
afford the reducing effect upon his salary for subsequent retirement
purposes.
An additional argument was made that many police chief appointments being subject to political pressures and the pleasure of a city
commissioner or council (the Spoils System) did not permit in practice
the establishment of a retirement income in any event, and, another
form of retirement or savings would be more appropriate than the State
Public Safety Retirement System.

-5-

The legislature must have and retain the right to correct
misinterpretation of its intent without intervening fixed contract
rights which violate public policy and common sense.

It is against

the general welfare, public policy and common sense to assume that a
class of public safety officials may be both employed full time as a
police chief, sheriff or public safety commissioner and, at the same
time, be ''retired11 from the same employment from which he is drawing
a full salary.

At the very least, legislation so interpreted should

be clearly enunciated and its intent unclouded as a result of legislative floor debates.
No argument is made that either the legislature or the retirement
defendants may unconstitutionally impair retirement contracts.

Indeed,

the sanctity and immunity from legislative or agency meddling with
vested retirement rights is an article of faith of these defendants,
and they have gone to great lengths to defend this principle.

But,

the attaching of such contract rights in the factual situation here
involved i_s denied by them.

.6-

ARGUMENT
I

NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS WERE
ACQUIRED BY THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS BY
REASON OF THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO 49-11-1,
U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED

It has been heretofore noted that the retirement defendants are
not arguing that either they or the legislature can unconstitutionally
impair fully vested and established contract rights to retirement
benefits.

It is respectfully suggested, nevertheless, that this case

is not such a situation on its own facts, and that the right of the
individual twenty-one plaintiffs here did not ripen into contract
rights which could not be altered or amended by subsequent legislative
action.
Is the legislature bound by an interpretation of law made by an
agency of the State contrary to its intent, which permanently
established rights in individuals which cannot be abrogated by subsequent clarifying amendment?

If the answer to this question is an

unqualified affirmative then the judgment of the court below is entitled
to affirmation without further inquiry.

Contrarily, if there are facts

and circumstances which could avoid the strict application of such a
judicial rule then inquiry must be further directed to the facts of
this case to determine the proper rule on these facts.

We believe

that sound public policy and common sense require that such inquiry
be made and the facts of this case present an excellent reason for
doing so.
-7-

The sole evidence on the question of legislative intent is the
record of the floor debate in the House when House Bill 239 was
submitted to the legislature (R-182-183).

It is abundantly clear

from this debate and the statements of its sponsor and others, that
the Bill was not contemplated to accomplish the anomaly of permitting
a class of pubiic safety individuals to draw retirement pay and
continue working at the same job from which such "retirement"
occurred at the same level of pay.

It should be noted that to do

so is in clear contravention of then and now existing law [49-11-34;
49-11-37; 49-11-8(30)] which must then have been deemed to be repealed
by implication, a condition not favored in the law.

Glenn v. Perrel1,

304 P 2 380 - Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P 2 480.
In order to substantially alter and repeal existing law,
particularly in an area of public policy such as this, we urge that
it must be the clear intent of the legislature.

The subcommittee and

the body of the legislature must be apprised of the sponsors intent
and be permitted to cast a vote in light of the stated intent.

To

allow individual rights to attach which cannot be altered by subsequent legislative action to correct an oversight or a misinterpretation
is to shackle the state and its citizens with expense and consequence
which should not be tolerated in the light of our citizen legislature
and our established system of representative government.
-8-
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seek to do no more than that.

While the complaint of the individual plaintiffs resounds with
claims of "retroactive application" by the attempted enforcement of
the 1985 Amendment, it is clear that no such action was taken or
threatened by the Retirement defendants.

No demand was made or

contemplated which would have required these individuals to repay
the sums received between the 1983 and the 1985 enactments.

Both

the law, as enacted in 1985, and the action of the retirement
defendants was prospective, that is, to be applied after the
effective date of the act.

While it was contemplated that the

flowing spigot of an unintended windfall would be shut off. no
attempt was made or contemplated which would have required the
flow to be poured back up the spigot.

The legislature did not see

fit to grandfather these individual plaintiffs and in the absence
of such direction, the retirement defendants had no choice but to
seek to cut off the thus unauthorized payments.
Almost all legislation effectively alters individual rights.
The right of persons to utilize various statutory schemes to avoid
or delay taxes is a notable case in point.

Having spent time and

money to utilize such a statute does not result in "vested rights"
or "contract rights" which may not subsequently be altered by
legislation.
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II

"VESTED RIGHTS" IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE AND
THIS COURT HAS HERETOFORE RECOGNIZED A
"SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE" IN LIEU OF SUCH
A RIGHT IN PUBLIC PENSION LAW

The term "vested rights" is not defined by either the Federal or
State Constitutions, has not been deemed to be an absolute, but rests
in right reason and natural justice.

The most authoritative source

on statutory construction has further stated:
And as explained by an eminent constitutional
authority, as it is a right which rests upon
equities it has reasonable limits and restrictions;
it must have some regard to the general welfare and
public policy; it cannot be a right which is to be
examined, settled, and defended on a distinct and
separate consideration of the individual case, but
rather on broad and general grounds which embrace
the welfare of the whole community, and which seek
the equal and impartial protection of the interest
of all.
Sands Sutherland Statutory Construction. Fourth Edition, Vol. 2,
P. 268, S 41,06, Statutes affecting vested rights.
We respectfully suggest that on the facts this is a case where
such inquiry is required.
We have been unable to discover any law which supports the proposition that one can be "retired" and drawing retirement pay while
still fully employed and paid for the same job from which he was
"retired."

Conversely, there is considerable law to support the

amendment which the legislature considered it was passing in 1983.
-12-
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That ruling is particularly apropos here when the facts and the
alternatives are examined.

This is not a case where an attempt is

being made to deny a retirement benefit.

Contrarily, should the

Court reverse the lower court and permit the retirement defendants
to implement the 1985 amendment, it is clear from the record (R-35)
that each of these individual plaintiffs may indeed substantially
enhance his retirement benefit.

This is a procedural rather than a

substantive change because it relates only to the time of taking a
vested pension and not its availability, a reduction in amount, or
divestment.
450).

(Pitcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P^

These individual plaintiffs would simply be denied an

unintended windfall and be required to either retire or cease to
draw retirement pay.

Certainly these facts constitute a substantial

substitute as required by Newcombe, supra.
The retirement defendants have no quarrel with Driggs, supra.
Indeed, the holding of that case is fully subscribed to on its facts.
Were this Court to equate the facts in this case with those of Driggs,
these defendants would prefer affirmation of the lower court.

But we

respectfully suggest that the facts are inapposite and require a
different ruling.

A distinction must be drawn between the vested

contractural right of a specific identifiable pension, and a pension
coupled with the right to continued employment in the position from
which one has "retired."
-14-
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CONCLUSION
When the facts are fully considered in this case and the rules
of law, equity, public policy and common sense are applied to them we
respectfully submit that the retirement defendants are entitled to
apply the 1985 amendment to these individual plaintiffs.

While it

may be argued that the monetary consequences as to these twenty-one
individuals is not actuarially significant, the principle established
if such relief is not granted may be highly significant.

Curative

legislation is generally looked upon with favor and enjoys the full
presumption of constitutionality.

It is clear that the legislature

sought in 1985 to correct an unintended interpretation of the 1983
amendment.

Public policy requires that no rights .cleariy contrary to

legislative intent may "vest" so that subsequent curative legislation
is legally inoperative.

Common sense and the general welfare support

the proposition that one may not simultaneously work full time and
draw full pay in employment from which he is "retired11 and drawing
full retirement pay to which he would otherwise qualify.
This Court is respectfully urged to reverse the order of the
lower court and command judgment, no cause of action, for the
retirement defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
Matrk A. Madsen v
A/ttorney at Law
Counsel f o r Defendants-Appellants
540 East Second South
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84102
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